May Newsletter
Welcome to the May edition of the CODE Newsletter!
This time will be different because we want to introduce you to a new member of the CODE team.
As of May 1, Jonata Anicetti has joined the CODE project as a postdoctoral researcher, and it didn’t take long before he was deep in the weeds of rare earths, weaponised interdependence, and the future of tech rivalry.
In this conversation, Jonata walks us through his past research, his ambitious plans within CODE, and what Europe might still salvage from the US–China tech standoff. Also: a sharp critique of Weaponised Interdependence and a strong reading list.
Let’s hear from Jonata directly 👇
Antonio Calcara: What was the focus of your PhD research?
Jonata Anicetti: In my PhD research, I focused on defence countertrade, and more specifically on defence offsets – arrangements that provide additional industrial and technological benefits to states purchasing foreign weapons. Although relatively obscure and often shrouded in secrecy, defence offsets account for roughly half of all global arms trade transactions. They play a significant role in shaping global supply chains, enabling technology transfer, and influencing the diffusion of military capabilities.
AC: What will your research on technology and geopolitics focus on?
JA: Within the CODE project, my research will focus on critical raw materials (CRMs) that underpin strategic dual-use technologies such as semiconductors, cloud computing, space systems, and artificial intelligence. Empirically, I will map the value chains of key materials –including graphite, titanium, rare earth elements, lithium, and others – tracing their nodes, links, and geopolitical chokepoints. Theoretically, I aim to develop a model to assess great power competition over securing CRMs, and the potential for these networks to be weaponized. At the policy level, my work seeks to inform and support the European Union in formulating its own strategy, and in crafting effective diplomatic and economic tools to compete in this increasingly contested domain.
AC: Why is your focus important?
JA: There is broad consensus that CRMs are central to today’s geo-tech competition, underpinning both economic resilience and military capabilities. Yet, a significant empirical – and even more so, theoretical – gap persists in the study of CRMs, limiting the effectiveness of policymaking in this area. Mapping CRM industries and developing a robust theoretical framework to interpret the strategic competition over these resources is therefore essential. To address this challenge, I will adopt a multidisciplinary, multi-method research design that integrates insights from economic geography, mining economics, international trade law, and international relations. Methodologically, I will employ network analysis, comparative case studies, and semi-structured interviews with industry stakeholders, government officials, and subject-matter experts.
AC: Speaking of the relationship between geopolitics and technology, how do you think it will evolve between the US and China, especially in light of the recent Geneva Accords?
JA: I believe the US and China are on a trajectory of escalating geo-technological rivalry. At the same time, we’re likely to see renewed efforts at diplomatic engagement – perhaps in the form of new “Geneva Accords.” Both nations recognise their deep economic interdependence and, one hopes, share a desire to avoid direct military conflict. Still, I view these gestures as largely tactical rather than strategic. The core of US Grand Strategy remains the containment of China, just as China’s primary objective is to break free from that containment. These fundamentally opposing goals are irreconcilable – and they will define the trajectory of US-China relations for years, if not decades, to come.
AC: What role can Europe play in the current technological competition, in your assessment?
JA: Europe is currently trailing behind the United States and China in the geo-technological race. It lacks both the scale and dynamism of US big tech and the interventionist capacity of the Chinese state. In recent decades, innovation has largely been driven by the civilian sector, which – thanks to globalisation – was able to outspend nation-states in R&D, leading to major technological breakthroughs. However, as globalisation slows or even reverses, and the international economy becomes more fragmented, I anticipate a resurgence of the public sector’s role in driving innovation. In this emerging landscape, it is crucial for the EU to pool resources and invest strategically in key technologies. Yet without a coherent and proactive geo-economic diplomacy, such investments may fall short of securing Europe’s position in this new era of technological competition.
AC: What contributions do you expect to make to the academic literature on the topic?
JA: My research engages with and seeks to advance the Weaponised Interdependence (WI) framework pioneered by Farrell and Newman, which has rapidly gained prominence in analysing the nexus between international security and international political economy. WI posits that certain states can exploit control over key nodes and chokepoints in global economic networks to exert power and coerce rivals. However, the framework has faced criticism for its focus on intangible networks – such as information and finance. Moreover, Farrell and Newman themselves have noted the lack of empirical and comparative studies, particularly from the Global South, which has led to conceptual stretching, misapplication, and analytical errors. Scholars often conflate WI with traditional economic coercion, while states may attempt to wield WI tools without fully grasping the underlying network structures – frequently producing unintended consequences that can harm allies and strengthen adversaries. My project aims to address these gaps by empirically mapping CRM supply chains – tangible networks centered in the Global South – and conducting comparative case studies involving the US, China, Russia, and the EU.
AC: Let's move on to the final question: what are the five books that have inspired your research the most?
JA: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Paul Kennedy), Discord and Collaboration (Arnold Wolfers), Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (Keith Krause), America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State (Linda Weiss), The Uses and Abuses of Weaponised Interdependence (Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman).
AC: Can you recommend any academic or non-academic articles that you consider particularly relevant for understanding the links between geopolitics and technology?
JA: One particularly insightful book review essay for understanding the intersection of geopolitics and technology is “Charting the Contours of the Geo-Tech World” by Timo Seidl, published in Geopolitics.
Two Fresh Drops for Your Reading Stack
After Jonata’s excellent book and article picks, I couldn’t resist slipping in two additions to your reading stack – this time, straight from my own desk.
Both papers dive into cloud computing as a cornerstone of geopolitical and military infrastructure: one unpacks the myths surrounding European cloud policy, the other examines NATO’s digital transformation in practice.
“European Cloud Computing Policy: Failing in Europe to Succeed Nationally?”
Why does the EU keep launching cloud initiatives that seem to fall short – yet never quite collapse? My open-access paper, published in West European Politics, explores that puzzle and offers a counterintuitive answer: some failures in EU cloud policy may be strategic rather than accidental. By keeping integration just incomplete enough, member states have used EU-level efforts to fortify their national cloud ecosystems and enhance their leverage with dominant non-European providers.
“NATO’s Digital Modernisation: The Case of Cloud Computing”
In a paper for The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), I take a closer look at how cloud computing is becoming a foundational layer of NATO’s digital transformation. As warfare becomes increasingly multi-domain and data-driven, cloud infrastructure is no longer optional – it’s strategic. With the NATO summit just around the corner, the paper offers timely reflections on how the alliance can move from ambition to implementation – through what I call “cooperation by design.”
Next Stop: EUIA Conference 2025
The European Union in International Affairs (EUIA) conference returns to Brussels on 21–23 May, and this year’s theme – Europe in a Fragmenting World – couldn’t be more fitting.
I’ll be chairing the very first panel on Wednesday, 21 May from 9:00 to 10:30. The CODE team will present new research on Europe’s evolving role in the tech–power nexus.
Full programme here.
Source: https://www.euia.eu/
Thank you for reading – see you in the next issue.
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