The summer feels like ages ago, but back in June, we had the chance to welcome Guillaume Beaumier, all the way from Canada to Brussels, for our CODE workshop on artificial intelligence. It’s not an exaggeration to say that he’s a leading scholar in International Political Economy.
And here is our conversation!
Antonio Calcara: Could you tell us a bit about your background and main line of work?
Guillaume Beaumier: I am an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at l’École nationale d’administration publique (ENAP). Prior to this appointment, I earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Warwick (2017–2021) and completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University (2021–2023). My early research focused on the governance of trade and investment. During my doctoral studies, I initially set out to examine how privacy regulations emerged across countries and influenced the development of digital trade. Over time, my research shifted toward a deeper investigation of how national data privacy regimes are shaped by the cross-border interactions of public and private actors. In my dissertation, I specifically explored the evolution of privacy governance in the United States and the European Union, emphasizing how their regulatory trajectories have developed through mutual interaction rather than simple opposition.
AC: What does your research on technology and geopolitics focus on?
GB: As security concerns surrounding information flows gained prominence, particularly in the wake of the Snowden revelations, my research increasingly turned toward understanding how states that control digital infrastructures accumulate significant power within the global economy. This shift led me to explore the geopolitical implications of digital infrastructures, especially how their spatial distribution embeds power dynamics in specific geographies. In recent work, I have notably highlighted how the United States can leverage the structure of the global semiconductor value chain for coercive ends. Building on this, my current research agenda examines how the weaponization of digital infrastructures prompts other actors to pursue the development of alternative infrastructures in an effort to reduce strategic dependence.
AC: Why do you believe this research area is important or timely?
GB: For many years, economic and security concerns were largely studied in isolation. In line with liberal ideals, most scholars and policymakers focused on how globalization could enhance prosperity and who stood to benefit. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and the intensifying U.S.-China trade war have underscored the strategic importance of the geographical distribution of economic activities. States that control critical economic hubs can leverage them to advance political objectives. While the strategic use of economic power is not a new phenomenon, the resurgence of interest in geoeconomics has prompted governments to adopt a more interventionist role in the global economy. The widespread return of industrial policy is a clear manifestation of this shift. In this evolving landscape, understanding geopolitical dynamics has become essential for analyzing the trajectory of the global economy.
AC: Given your expertise in the framework of Weaponized Interdependence, how do you think geopolitics is reshaping the importance of network centrality in the digital era?
GB: Over the past decade, states controlling key economic hubs have increasingly sought to weaponize them for geopolitical purposes. This includes, for example, the United States leveraging its dominance over global digital networks for surveillance and restricting exports of advanced semiconductors, as well as China imposing new export controls on rare earth elements. A central claim of the theory of weaponized interdependence is that such measures are especially effective because the targeted actors have few, if any, viable alternatives to the economic hubs being weaponized. While this remains true, economic networks are not static. Once weaponized, other countries often seek to reduce their exposure by developing alternatives. My ongoing research suggests that network centrality is most likely to erode when network effects are relatively weak. For instance, despite the United States weaponizing the dollar, it continues to serve as the dominant global currency, largely because the benefits of a common medium of exchange are substantial for all international actors. By contrast, we might expect more rapid diversification in areas like rare earth mining and refining, where network effects are not as important, even though other barriers to entry, such as high capital costs and environmental constraints, may still play a role. At the same time, given the economic and political costs associated with reshoring or duplicating production capacity, important questions remain about how far states are willing to go to reduce their dependence and whether this will lead to the formation of new regional economic blocs.
AC: What role can Europe play in the current technological competition, in your assessment?
GB: Together with the United States and China, Europe is one of the three largest economies in the world and, as such, holds considerable market power to shape global outcomes. As I argue in a recent article published in Global Studies Quarterly, this has allowed Europe to emerge as a global regulatory power, particularly in its efforts to rein in American Big Tech companies. However, in an era of intensifying technological competition, Europe faces two key challenges. First, it generally lags behind both the United States and China in the development of strategic technologies such as artificial intelligence, electric batteries, and quantum computing. This gap raises the risk of technological dependence on external actors in areas of future geopolitical importance. To mitigate this, greater investment is needed to strengthen Europe’s indigenous innovation capacities. Second, the European Union remains too fragmented in its adoption and implementation of geoeconomic measures. Each new sanctions package requires unanimous approval by all member states, and enforcement is largely delegated to national agencies. While full political integration remains unlikely, the EU must develop new coordination mechanisms in this domain if it is to realize its full geoeconomic potential.
AC: What are the five books that inspired your research the most?
GB: Several works have been particularly influential in shaping my thinking and approach to research. The following five books are certainly some of those:
Drezner, D. W. (2007). All politics is global: Explaining international regulatory regimes. Princeton University Press.
Farrell, H., & Newman, A. (2019). Of privacy and power: The transatlantic struggle over freedom and security. Princeton University Press.
Green, J. F. (2014). Rethinking private authority: Agents and entrepreneurs in global environmental governance. Princeton University Press.
Avant, D. D., Finnemore, M., & Sell, S. K. (Eds.). (2010). Who governs the globe? Cambridge University Press.
Braithwaite, J., & Drahos, P. (2000). Global business regulation. Cambridge University Press.
AC: Can you recommend any (non-)academic articles that you consider particularly relevant for understanding the links between geopolitics and technology?
GB: Of course! Below you will find those that immediately came to my mind.
Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351.
Bridges, M. (2024, May 10). Infrastructure is remaking geopolitics. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/infrastructure-remaking-geopolitics.
Tett, G. (2023, April 13). Welcome to the new age of geoeconomics. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/daf5ce11-c95b-4964-8df1-7463f0f9a81b.
Demarais, A., & Newman, A. (2024, November 14). Europe must unlock its geoeconomic power. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/europe/europe-must-unlock-its-geoeconomic-power.
AC: Thank you so much, Guillaume, for this very interesting conversation. It was great having you with us!