The cosmic tug of war: U.S.-China space rivalry and the race for allies
Hello, I’m back with more exciting news about … you guessed it: SPACE! 🚀
But first, the most important announcement – as sneak-peeked in the latest newsletter, the team has been all hands on deck getting ready for the inaugural lecture officially introducing the European Research Council-funded CODE project. Taking place on 12 May at the main campus of Vrije Universiteit Brussels, it will explore how technological competition is increasingly shaping geopolitics, with a special focus on the pressures it creates for Europe. You’re all invited (though tickets are going fast!), so make sure to check out the details and secure your spot here.
Now, without further ado… today’s post zooms in on the growing space rivalry between the United States (U.S.) and China, and how it’s putting countries around the world in a tough situation when it comes to choosing sides.
In the shadow of rocket launches and Moon missions, another, quieter competition is unfolding – a race for space partnerships. A few weeks ago, a top U.S. official openly warned that Europe was “caught between Beijing and Washington” and that “it’s sort of time for choosing” whose communications and satellite systems to rely on. Federal Communications Commissioner Brendan Carr urged European countries to choose between American networks, like SpaceX’s Starlink, and emerging Chinese alternatives, arguing that only by siding with “allied Western democracies” could they avoid the “real long-term bogey: the rise of the Chinese Communist Party.” It’s not the first time the U.S. has pushed this ‘choosing sides’ message – a reminder of how technology and partnerships are increasingly at the heart of geopolitical competition.
China later responded. A chief designer of its lunar exploration programme offered a rare glimpse into Beijing’s mounting frustration, accusing the U.S. of systematically undermining its efforts to build partnerships with third countries. This interference operates on two levels: through direct political pressure on potential partners and through policy and legal barriers such as export controls under the ITAR regulations or the Wolf Amendment, which together create a hostile environment for countries to cooperate with China.
Why are the U.S. and China so concerned about who teams up with whom in space? At root, alliance-building enables each power to shape the emerging space order to its advantage. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union competed for influence through space milestones; today’s rivalry is more about forging lasting coalitions for sustainable space presence. ‘Partnership’ can translate into norm-setting authority, allowing states to define the rules of the game in their favour and bolstering security. The U.S.-led Artemis Accords and China’s International Lunar Research Station exemplify this competition: two rival frameworks seeking to establish how nations operate on the Moon, who can gain early access to its resources, and how to deny the adversary exclusive footholds in strategic areas.
Source: Seredata
At the same time, there are powerful symbolic and economic incentives at play. Leading a broad coalition of spacefaring nations confers technological prestige and projects an image of global leadership. It also unlocks significant commercial opportunities, as partner countries often become customers for spacecraft, satellite systems, and services, and over time, adopt the leader’s technical standards. To illustrate, the graph below shows how Europe’s participation in the International Space Station has generated tangible benefits. Each euro spent on the ISS produced €1.8 in added value to European economies, reinforcing the sector’s role as a driver of growth. Beyond industry, ISS cooperation has elevated research capacities and strengthened societal engagement through education initiatives and public outreach. So, in effect, space partnerships do not just benefit governments or Big Tech; they lift entire ecosystems of innovation and economies, making the strategic value of alliances in space even more profound.
Source: ESA
Recognising this, both Beijing and Washington have aggressively expanded their diplomatic playbooks, utilising a mix of tools: formal agreements, technology transfers, launch services, ground station deals, promises of astronaut access, etc. Yet their strategies differ subtly. The U.S. approach often ties partners into a broader framework of shared commitments, such as the Artemis Accords mentioned above. The Chinese model, however, leans towards bilateralism with pragmatism and fewer political strings attached, which is an attractive proposition for states wary of Western conditionality. While much still needs to be studied about the effectiveness of these competing strategies, one thing is clear: the U.S. faces growing pressure to recalibrate its space diplomacy. By framing space primarily through a military lens and seeking to preserve its leadership position, Washington has marginalised other actors like Europe and Africa, creating openings that China exploits by promoting space cooperation through a developmental or “for the benefit of all humanity” narrative. Combined with the uncertainty from the Trump-era turbulence, it risks pushing allies and non-allies alike closer to Beijing’s orbit.
For third countries caught in the middle, this space rivalry presents a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they are enjoying unprecedented opportunities to access funding, technology, and missions that were once out of reach. On the other hand, the growing polarisation risks forcing them into difficult strategic choices. Thus far, many countries are hedging, engaging with both great powers to maximise benefits while avoiding firm alignment. Thailand offers a clear example: it initially signed onto China’s International Lunar Research Station programme before later joining the Artemis Accords, making it one of the first countries to officially have its feet in two boats. It would be fascinating to explore its decision-making process and how Washington and Beijing perceive such dual alignments (perhaps a topic for a future post!). The same goes for Brazil, which was traditionally seen as part of the U.S. sphere of influence but is now deepening ties with China through satellite and ground station projects.
In contrast, some states have tended towards selective alignment, particularly where incentives are immediate and substantial. Several African nations, for instance, have expanded their partnerships with China. While these relationships are often pragmatic and transactional rather than expressions of deep strategic allegiance, they nonetheless can carry significant security implications. Although not conclusively established, some scholars have found correlations between the increasing alignment of African countries with China at multilateral forums like the United Nations General Assembly and their participation in the Belt and Road Initiative.
Source: ODI Global
As for Europe, it increasingly recognises the risks associated with technological dependency on the U.S. and has shifted focus towards enhancing competitiveness and safeguarding its strategic autonomy. Incidents such as the reliance on Starlink during the Ukraine conflict and tensions experienced during the current Trump administration have only reinforced Europe’s determination to strengthen its capabilities. Nevertheless, Europe’s actions do not constitute overt confrontation or balancing in the strict realist sense. Rather, they represent a form of soft balancing within the alliance framework, “soft balancing between friends” as Oswald argues. With regard to Beijing, even though current political sensitivities make new collaboration unlikely – with, as far as we know, only one ongoing joint project between the European Space Agency and the Chinese Academy of Science initiated in 2015 – a future scenario where the EU and China rekindle selective space collaboration, potentially via third parties, cannot be ruled out.
Nonetheless, as geopolitical rivalry intensifies, the strategic room for manoeuvre is likely to shrink, and the cost of maintaining a noncommittal stance could become increasingly difficult to bear. While focusing exclusively on the U.S. and China here, it is acknowledged that many emerging space powers are also actively expanding their capabilities and diplomatic outreach. Whatever unfolds, in this new space race, the decisions third countries make will matter and help redraw the fault lines of tomorrow’s space order.
That’s my current take on the unfolding tug-of-war between the U.S. and China in the race for space alliances, a topic that will also be at the heart of my PhD research. I’d love to hear your thoughts and feedback on these ideas! Feel free to drop a comment or reach out to our team.
Until next time – ad astra!